Much has been written about recidivist punishments, particularly within the area of criminology. However there is a notorious lack of penal philosophical reflection on this issue. This book attempts to fill that gap by presenting the philosopher’s view on this matter as a way of furthering the debate on recidivist punishments.

The Protein Ontology (PRO) provides a formal, logically-based classification of specific protein classes including structured representations of protein isoforms, variants and modified forms. Initially focused on proteins found in human, mouse and Escherichia coli, PRO now includes representations of protein complexes. The PRO Consortium works in concert with the developers of other biomedical ontologies and protein knowledge bases to provide the ability to formally organize and integrate representations of precise protein forms so as to enhance accessibility to results of protein (...) research. PRO (http://pir.georgetown.edu/pro) is part of the Open Biomedical Ontologies (OBO) Foundry. (shrink)

Philosophers and cognitive scientists address the relationships among the senses and the connections between conscious experiences that form unified wholes. In this volume, cognitive scientists and philosophers examine two closely related aspects of mind and mental functioning: the relationships among the various senses and the links that connect different conscious experiences to form unified wholes. The contributors address a range of questions concerning how information from one sense influences the processing of information from the other senses and how unified states (...) of consciousness emerge from the bonds that tie conscious experiences together. Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness is the first book to address both of these topics, integrating scientific and philosophical concerns. A flood of recent work in both philosophy and perception science has challenged traditional conceptions of the sensory systems as operating in isolation. Contributors to the volume consider the ways in which perceptual contact with the world is or may be “multisensory,” discussing such subjects as the modeling of multisensory integration and philosophical aspects of sensory modalities. Recent years have seen a similar surge of interest in unity of consciousness. Contributors explore a range of questions on this topic, including the nature of that unity, the degree to which conscious experiences are unified, and the relationship between unified consciousness and the self. Contributors Tim Bayne, David J. Bennett, Berit Brogaard, Barry Dainton, Ophelia Deroy, Frederique de Vignemont, Marc Ernst, Richard Held, Christopher S. Hill, Geoffrey Lee, Kristan Marlow, Farid Masrour, Jennifer Matey, Casey O'Callaghan, Cesare V. Parise, Kevin Rice, Elizabeth Schechter, Pawan Sinha, Julia Trommershaeuser, Loes C. J. van Dam, Jonathan Vogel, James Van Cleve, Robert Van Gulick, Jonas Wulff. (shrink)

Description: T.R.V. Murti was an original and leading thinker among the Indian philosophers of the twentieth century. He had a brilliant philosophical mind, a love of analysis and argument, and a respect for texts, especially the ones with which he disagreed, as seen in his most important book, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism. With both traditional Shastri training and a Western style Ph.D., Murti was able to bring both strengths to his writing and teaching. Murti knew everything by heart, all (...) the Sutra texts, the Upanisads and other philosophical classics, Panini s grammar, and Patanjali s Great Commentary and other core texts. Upon that foundation, he evaluated doctrines and ideas. Though a philosopher of the classical type, he was also alive to the latest philosophical currents of his day and effectively related the wisdom of traditional teaching to the contemporary questions. It was this last quality that made him a most sought after teacher by students from around the world. Murti spoke with such eloquence and authority that few would dare to interrupt him. He represented the best of Indian philosophical tradition to the world through his teaching at places such as Oxford, Copenhagen, Harvard, Hawaii, and McMaster University in Canada. This book offers an overview and assessment of Murti s scholarship on Buddhism in its Brahmanical context, Advaita Vedanta and Buddhism, Philosophy of Language and Philosophy of spirit. The book begins with a biography of Murti and a discussion of the philosophical influences upon him. Also included is a complete list of Murti s writings. (shrink)

“There ceases to be any reason to count awareness as an essential trait of observation.”-from “Stimulus and Meaning”As W. V. Quine sees it we must, in the interests of science, resist “the old tendency to associate observation sentences with a subjective sensory subject matter,” because such sentences are “meant to be the intersubjective tribunal of scientific hypotheses“; observation sentences are meant to be the independent and objective control of scientific theory. Accordingly, Quine has developed a behaviouristic operational definition of an (...) observation sentence for the purpose of dispelling the air of subjectivity which surrounds the notion of observation.In this paper I argue that his observation-sentence definition, or criterion, fails to fulfil this purpose. In the first half of the paper, I describe in particular the kind of subjectivism which most worries Quine-what he calls the epistemological nihilism of Hanson, Kuhn and Polanyi-and I then turn to Quine's remedy, his observation criterion. (shrink)

“There ceases to be any reason to count awareness as an essential trait of observation.”-from “Stimulus and Meaning”As W. V. Quine sees it we must, in the interests of science, resist “the old tendency to associate observation sentences with a subjective sensory subject matter,” because such sentences are “meant to be the intersubjective tribunal of scientific hypotheses“; observation sentences are meant to be the independent and objective control of scientific theory. Accordingly, Quine has developed a behaviouristic operational definition of an (...) observation sentence for the purpose of dispelling the air of subjectivity which surrounds the notion of observation.In this paper I argue that his observation-sentence definition, or criterion, fails to fulfil this purpose. In the first half of the paper, I describe in particular the kind of subjectivism which most worries Quine-what he calls the epistemological nihilism of Hanson, Kuhn and Polanyi-and I then turn to Quine's remedy, his observation criterion. (shrink)

A uniform upper bound on a class of Turing degrees is the Turing degree of a function which parametrizes the collection of all functions whose degree is in the given class. I prove that if a is a uniform upper bound on an ideal of degrees then a is the jump of a degree c with this additional property: there is a uniform bound b<a so that b V c < a.

Carnap, R. Empiricism, semantics, and ontology.--Quine, W. V. Two dogmas of empiricism. Meaning and translation.--Sellars, W. Empiricism and the philosophy of mind.--Putnam, H. Brains and behaviour.--Popper, K. R. Science: conjectures and refutations.--Feyerabend, P. K. Science without experience. How to be a good empiricist--a plea for tolerance in matters epistemological.--Kuhn, T. S. Incommensurability and paradigms.--Hesse, M. Duhem, Quine and a new empiricism.--Chomsky, N. Recent contributions to the theory of innate ideas.--Putnam, H. The innateness hypothesis and explanatory models in linguistics.--Goodman, N. The (...) epistemological argument.--Quine, W. V. Linguistics and philosophy.--Edgley, R. Chomsky's theory of innate ideas.--Fodor, J. A. Methodological arguments for behaviorism.--Chomsky, N. Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language.--Annotated bibliography (p. 319-326). (shrink)

Edward Harold Fulcher Swain (1883?1970) developed a unique idea about the importance of forests, advocating the creation of a new society based upon forests, and he pursued policies to implement his unique vision of forestry when he served as the Director of Queensland's Forestry Board from 1918 to 1924 and the Forestry Commissioner for New South Wales from 1935 to 1948. Swain's beliefs developed out of a combination of his Australian experiences and connections with foresters in the British Empire (...) and America. When he could not convince Australian elites about the need to create a forest-based society, he asked foresters at the 1947 Empire Forestry Conference in London to assert the primacy of forestry in land management in the British Empire. Many foresters positively received parts of Swain's argument, but his ideas could never be fully implemented in the British Empire because of the dominance of agrarian doctrines of development in post-Second World War colonial planning and the rapid process of decolonization. Swain's life sheds light onto current debates among historians about the origin and legacy of forestry in Australia and the British Empire. His ideas, many that parallel the basic tenets of modern environmentalism, require historians to rethink the relationship between Empire forestry and environmentalism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Pragmatism and a Behavioral Theory of Meaning HAROLD N. LEE IT HAS BEEN ALMOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS since the publication of Peirce's article "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" in the Popular Science Monthly. There Peirce stated what came to be called The Pragmatic Maxim. 1 Since then pragmatism has been developed and expounded by many proponents. Some of the developments have differed markedly from others, and some (...) of these differences are not easily compatible.2 Opponents of pragmatism have differed in their interpretations in step with the proponents. As the century is rounded out, we should be able to review the scene and appraise the maneuvers and sorties. Just what is pragmatism? It has often been held that pragmatism is not the name of a philosophy but only of a loose collection of philosophies having at most a faint family resemblance. It must be admitted that this interpretation received some support from James's genial and hospitable personality. Nevertheless, I think it is incorrect. We can now discern a central, characterizing position which the early proponents of the new movement were setting forth and defending; and we can free it from misunderstandings that have historically beset it. It was apparent from the first that action and the consequences of action were to be regarded as fundamental to the new position, but this characterization is vague enough to cover many incompatible special developments. It can be sharpened now, after a century of discussion and debate, and we can identify the respects in which action is central, thus separating the general position from the special interests belonging to one or another of the individuals who were its early advocates. Such clarification will reveal a pragmatism that is highly relevant to contemporary philosophy. I. Peirce proposed his maxim as a theory of meaning: the clear apprehension of an idea is to be obtained by considering the effects or consequences on future possible action that follow from the idea. Meanings consist in the possible effects of present experience on future behavior. In accordance with the pragmatic maxim, I shall take the behavioral theory of meaning and the behavioral theory of knowledge that issues from it to be the central position of pragmatism. What is either incompatible or unnecessary to this behavioral core is expendable, and if it has contributed to the misunderstanding or misrepresentation of the core, it should be abandoned in the further development of pragmatism. Both Peirce and James presented pragmatism primarily 1 Collected Papers o/ Charles Sanders Peirce, vols. 1-6 ed. by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss; vols. 7-8 ed. by Arthur W. Burks (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1931-35, 1958), vol. 5, paragraphs 2 and 402. Hereafter cited as CP followed by volume and paragraph number. 2 See A. O. Lovejoy, "The Thirteen Pragmatisms," Journal o[ Philosophy, V (1908); reprinted in The Thirteen Pragmatisms and Other Essays (Baltimore: The Johns HopkinsPress, 1963). [435] 436 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY as a method, but in the philosophies of both, and of Dewey as well, the emphasis on method is often obscured by specific doctrines in some field such as ontology, epistemology or ethics; and in the cases especially of James and Dewey, it was the special doetrines that elicited the bulk of the adverse criticism. The pragmatism of all the early pragmatists was so mixed with other advocacies and causes that it was often difficult to distinguish between what should be called pragmatic and what should not. Pragmatism did not emerge full-blown in stark separateness. Certain auxiliary positions that revolve around the behavioral theory of meaning also characterize pragmatism. They are to be found in the writings of all the early pragmatists and both yield and receive systematic support from the behavioral theory of meaning. Together with the theory of meaning they demarcate the core of pragmatism. The list is as follows: (1) Meaning and knowledge are behaviorally defined. (2) The various forms of pragmatism share an evolutionary, naturalistic outlook. (3) They all emphasize, in harmony with the evolutionary outlook, process and time-especially the continuity of passage and temporality. (4) They all show, in harmony with the continuity of process, a tendency to reject Cartesian dualism... (shrink)

v. 1. Nicomachean ethics. Politics. The Athenian Constitution. Rhetoric. On Poetics.--v. 2. Logic.--v. 3. Physics. Metaphysics. On the soul. Short physical treaties.--v. 4. On the heavens. On generation and corruption. Meteorology. Biological treatises.

This unique volume is a translation of a Danish book originally published in 1976. It is not written out of great sympathy for Kierkegaard's position, but out of an intense determination for accurate historical scholarship. The author claims as his inspiration Paul V. Rubow, and writes from a modern historic point of view which he identifies as "neopositivistic." The proclaimed thesis of the book is that Kierkegaard scholarship "went down the wrong track" from the very beginning, and that much of (...) this mistake is due to Kierkegaard himself. Kierkegaard scholars have misinterpreted the literature, especially the letters and papers, and have taken as factual much of what was really "creative fiction.". (shrink)

Both editors have long been known for their work on Plotinus. Schwyzer has published important articles on the MSS A, V, and D, on the Pseudo-Aristotelian Theology and its relation to Porphyry's edition of the Enneads, on Plotinus' interpretation of Timaeus 35 A, and on the relation of Plotinus' triad of hypostases to his interpretation of Parmenides 139-145 ; and he is the author of the new article on Plotinus in the Pauly-Wissowa Realencyclopädie. Ever since 1933 Henry has been publishing (...) a series of books and articles dealing with the text of Plotinus, its constitution, influence, and transmission. Of these works three books are especially important, since they were meant to constitute a critical introduction to the edition of the Enneads. The first of these, Recherches sur la Préparation Évangélique d'Eusèbe et l'Édition Perdue des Oeuvres de Plotin Publiée par Eustochius, undertakes to establish the fidelity of Porphyry, the first editor of the Enneads, to the autographs of Plotinus from which he made his recension. The second, Études Plotiniennes I: Les États du Texte de Plotin, a detailed study of the indirect tradition, reinforces this conclusion and establishes the authority of the archetype of the direct tradition. That archetype, Henry concludes, was as faithful to the recension of Porphyry as Porphyry was to the original written by Plotinus, and the indirect tradition is rather a guarantee of the faithfulness of the Porphyrian edition reproduced by the archetype than a source of corrections for the text of our MSS. The third volume, Études Plotiniennes II: Les Manuscrits des Ennéades, an exhaustive study of the character and history of the extant MSS, has for its purpose the determination of the necessary and sufficient evidence for the reconstitution of the archetype, the common ancestor of all the MSS of the direct tradition. No attempt is made to establish a stemma leading from the original to the extant MSS. Henry is here concerned rather to identify in the mass of material all the representative elements of the direct tradition and so to establish the apparatus of the critical edition on a basis broad enough to be forever independent of any hypothesis concerning the ultimate relations of the families represented by the extant MSS. In four chapters he studies the MSS of groups w, x, y, z respectively, in a fifth the MSS which Perna used for the editio princeps, and in two Appendices four lost MSS of which some record remains and the fragment of Eusebius in Vaticanus Rossianus 986. The volume is equipped with a detailed inventory of the MSS, a table of water, marks, and an index of proper names. One of the most important results of this study of Henry's is the identification of the MSS derivative from A, several of which had been used as independent witnesses to the arche- typal text but which Henry has shown to have no textual authority whatever. The results of this volume, however, are to be corrected in the light of three pages of "Corrections et Compléments" at the end of the second edition, which save for this list is an exact reimpression of the first. In 1946 Henry and Schwyzer began their collaboration in the preparation of the critical edition, and their study of the variants led them to certain conclusions different from those that Henry had printed in Les Manuscrits. In particular, they decided that D, which Henry had, though with some hesitation, treated as a member of family y, does not belong to y or to any other of the recognized groups of MSS but constitutes a family of its own; and they distinguished in the hand which Henry had hitherto called A1 and Schwyzer A2 two separate hands: one, hereafter to be called A1, which they believe to be that of the scribe of A himself correcting his MS from a source different from any extant MS and different also from the sub-archetypes of these MSS, so that the readings of A1 must represent a separate family or another archetype ; and a second, hereafter to be called A2, the corrections of which appear to be conjectures and so to have no authority for the text. (shrink)